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Abstract
The Mermin-Squires Music Hall inteludium on the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen affair is analyzed by
showing the fallacity of the One-Borel-Normality Criterion and the necessity of replacing it with
the more restrictive Algorithmic-Randomness Criterion
∗URL: http://www.gavrielsegre.com; Electronic address: info@gavrielsegre.com
1
Let us consider the Squires’ Music Hall’s inteludium [1] based on Mermin’s analysis of
the Einstein-Podolski-Rosen experiment [2]:
Alice and Bob are able of executing a show at first sight astonishing:
they are closed in two separated boxes of a theatre’s stage so that they can’t communicate
each other.
At regular intervals two public’s people, let’s say one from the right side and the other
from the left side of the parterre, give respectively to Alice and Bob a ticket on which it is
written one of the numbers 1, 2 or 3.
The choice of the numbers appearing on the tickets the two spectators take to the artists
is absolutely random.
At this point Alice and Bob are asked to write YES or NO on the received ticket.
Obviously Alice can’t know which number is written on Bob’s ticket and viceversa.
The show’s exceptionality is that all the times Alice and Bob receive a couple of
tickets on which it is written the same number, they answer in the same way
Let us now suppose to be in the public and to look for a criterion in order to establish if
Alice and Bob are really telepathic or they are simply swindlers.
Indeed anyone would think that there is a very simplest explanation of Alice and Bob’s
performance: they agreed before the show on how to answer.
Is there, then, a way of certifying if this is the case?
Let us adopt the following notation:
• tA(n) , tB(n) denote the tickets given, respectively, to Alice and Bob at the n
th repeti-
tion of the performance
• aA(n) , aB(n) denote the answers written, respectively, by Alice and Bob on the n
th
ticket
By hypothesis {tA(n)} and {tB(n)} are two independent sequence of i.i.d. uniform random
variables over {1, 2, 3}:
Prob(tA(n) = i) =
1
3
∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, ∀n ∈ N (1)
Prob(tB(n) = i) =
1
3
∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, ∀n ∈ N (2)
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Let us then introduce the concordance sequence C¯ ∈ {0, 1}∞ whose nth digit Cn is
defined as:
Cn :=


1 if aA(n) = aB(n) ,
0 otherwise.
(3)
Squires introduced the following:
Theorem .1
CRITERION OF 1-BOREL NORMALITY
HP:
∃φ ∈ RECURSIV E −MAPS({1, 2, 3}, {Y ES,NO}) :
aA(n) = φ(tA(n)) and aB(n) = φ(tB(n)) (4)
TH:
p1−Borel(C¯) doesn’t hold (5)
PROOF:
We have clearly that:
N0(φ(1)φ(2)φ(3)) 6= N1(φ(1)φ(2)φ(3)) (6)
By the eq.1 and the Law of Large Numbers it immediately follows that C¯ can’t be 1-normal.

Anyway Squires doesn’t consider the case in which Alice and Bob adopt a more clever
way of cheating, i.e. they use a previously concorded answering-algorithm depending also
from n; in this way they may easily to scoff at Squires’ criterion of Borel-1-normality.
Let us suppose, for example, that each of them answers according to the following rule:
a(n)(t) :=


Y ES if t = 1 ,
NO if t = 2 ,
Y ES if t = 3 and n is even,
NO if t = 3 and n is odd,
(7)
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Since in this case the according-rule doesn’t break the balance among YES and NO, by
the eq.1 and the Law of Large Numbers it follows immediately that C¯ is Borel-1-normal.
So if Alice and Bob answer according to this rule, they scoff at Squires according to which
they appear as really telepathic.
There exist, anyway, a way to unmask the deception; this, anyway, requires the adoption
of a stronger criterion:
Theorem .2
CRITERION OF ALGORITHMIC RANDOMNESS
HP:
∃φ ∈ RECURSIV E −MAPS({1, 2, 3} × N, {Y ES,NO}) :
aA(n) = φ(tA(n) , n) and aB(n) = φ(tB(n) , n) (8)
TH:
C¯ /∈ RANDOM({0, 1}∞) (9)
PROOF:
The Chaitin-Schnorr Theorem [3] states the equivalence of Martin-Lo¨f statistical character-
ization of algorithmic-randomness and Chaitin’s one as algorithmic incompressibility:
x¯ ∈ RANDOM({0, 1}∞) ⇔ ∃c > 0 : I(~x(n)) ≥ n− c ∀n ≥ 1 (10)
where:
I(~x) := min{|~u| : U(~u, λ) = ~x} (11)
and where U is a fixed Chaitin universal computer.
But by hypothesis Alice and Bob’s answer is algorithmically-compressible through the
rule φ ∈ RECURSIV E −MAPS({1, 2, 3} × N, {Y ES,NO}) they concorded before the
show, implying the thesis 
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